THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS’ LENDING TO PAKISTAN by Anwar, Mumtaz
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS’ LENDING TO
PAKISTAN
Mumtaz Anwar
Hamburg Institute of International Economics
10. January 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5601/
MPRA Paper No. 5601, posted 5. November 2007
  155 
Pakistan Economic and Social Review 
Volume 44, No. 2 (Winter 2006), pp. 155-180 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS’ LENDING 
TO PAKISTAN 
MUMTAZ ANWAR*
Abstract. This paper analyzes the determinants of multilateral aid from 
international financial institutions (IFIs) to Pakistan, focusing on the world three 
major IFIs, the World Bank, the IMF and the ADB. Political economic factors, 
notably bureaucratic interests and major shareholders economic interests, are 
suspected to be relevant in international aid allocation decisions. Pooled Tobit 
estimation analyses confirm this hypothesis. Although recipient need also proves 
to be a relevant determinant of lending, bureaucratic interest outranks the former. 
Among the main multilateral donors, the IDA and the ADB are shown to be more 
bureaucratic and stakeholders economic interest-oriented in their lending 
decisions than the IBRD and the IMF, which tend to adhere to official lending 
explanations. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A growing amount of literature on political economy suggests that multi-
lateral lending decisions are based on political economic factors in which 
donor interest prevails more than recipient need. In particular, international 
bureaucracy and its utility maximizing behaviour are generally considered to 
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play a major role. The corresponding line of argument strongly leans on the 
economic theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1994; Moe, 1997; Wintrobe, 
1997; Borcherding and Besocke, 2002; Michaelowa, 2003). Internal career 
structures and future prospects of obtaining better positions in their home 
countries governments provide an incentive to the bureaucrats working at 
multilateral financial institutions to disburse money to their home countries. 
Moreover, the major shareholder countries’ economic and political interests 
and the respective countries’ voting power at IFIs, are also considered as the 
major determinants of lending to the developing countries (Fleck and Kilby, 
2006; Andersen et al., 2005, 2006). 
 This paper applies a political economic analysis of decision making to 
major IFIs’ lending to Pakistan. The IFIs most relevant for Pakistan since 
1960 are the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). During the second half of the 20th century, 
these IFIs provided both financial support and policy advice to Pakistan. In 
2002, Pakistan ranked second among the recipients of International 
Development Agency (IDA) lending commitments (concessional window of 
World Bank lending). In addition, during the same year, Pakistan was also 
the second largest recipient, following India, of ADB loans, receiving US $ 
1.14 billion (20.1% of ADB’s total lending). The World Bank (2004a) 
justifies its important financial support to Pakistan by stating that, “it is 
primarily a reflection of Pakistan’s progress in a number of key areas of 
reform.” The IMF resumed its lending to Pakistan in 2000, after certain 
break-downs and suspensions. 
 Stone (2004) notes that neither of the IMF’s lending decisions had 
anything to do with Pakistan’s domestic economic management, which 
continued to be poor. Furthermore, it has been frequently noted that although 
Pakistan did not comply with IMF conditionalities and World Bank targets, 
new arrangements were still concluded (Hasan, 1998; Raman, 2000). 
 At the same time, as observed by Barro and Lee (2002), Pakistan was 
among the five developing countries which had the highest number of 
professional staff at the IMF in 1999. There is also some evidence that 
Pakistani nationals working with the IMF or other IFIs obtained top positions 
in their home government later on. 
 This creates some doubts about the actual objectives of IFIs’ lending 
decisions and raises some questions which should be further explored: Why 
did IFIs extend lending to Pakistan over last four decades? Was IFIs’ lending 
to Pakistan based on economic need, on previous performance of Pakistan’s 
economy, or could it be explained by bureaucratic interests? Can the decision 
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making process in IFIs be influenced by a higher percentage of voting power 
within these institutions? 
 In order to answer these and similar questions, we analyze the empirical 
evidence of World Bank, IMF and ADB lending to Pakistan over time. As 
far as the World Bank is concerned, we distinguish between the IDA and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), because the 
voting power of their shareholder countries on the executive boards is 
different for the two institutions. Previous empirical studies, such as that of 
Barro and Lee (2005), test similar questions using a cross-country analysis 
for a single institution, namely, the IMF. They find that loans tend to be 
larger and more frequent when a country has a bigger quota and more 
professional staff at the IMF, or when a country is more closely connected 
politically and economically to the major shareholding countries of the IMF. 
In this study, the analysis will be carried out across institutions but for a 
single recipient country. This approach has the advantage that potential 
differences in the incentive structures of different donor institutions can be 
examined. Moreover, looking at only one recipient allows us to follow the 
development in this particular country in more detail, and to consider our 
econometric analysis in the context of specific national developments. 
 The study is divided into four parts. Section II provides a brief overview 
of IFIs’ lending practices to Pakistan. In section III, hypotheses about the 
determinants of political decision making in these IFIs will be presented, and 
regression results for both the probability of obtaining loans and the size of 
these loans will be discussed. In this section, we will also present the results 
for each donor and compare the differences between them. The conclusions 
will be presented in section IV. 
 
II.  IFIs’ LENDING TO PAKISTAN: THE EVIDENCE 
International financial institutions have played a major role in providing 
large amounts of lending to Pakistan over the last fifty years. According to 
data provided by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
on total official flows, a total amount of US $ 28 billion in multilateral aid 
flows was disbursed to Pakistan from 1960-2002. More than 82% of these 
multilateral official flows came from three major international financial 
institutions, namely, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the 
IMF (OECD/DAC, 2005). 
 Among these, the World Bank (IBRD and IDA) was the largest source 
of multilateral flows to Pakistan, providing half the total resources. Pakistan 
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joined the World Bank in July 1950. Since 1952, according to the World 
Bank (2004b) Country Brief, the World Bank has approved 85 loans and 125 
credits for Pakistan, totaling more than US $ 14.3 billion. In May 2005, the 
World Bank announced another package of US $ 4.5 billion to Pakistan for 
three years, which will enhance its annual lending to Pakistan from about 
US $ 900 million to US $ 1.5 billion. In sum, Pakistan is among the top ten 
recipients of World Bank lending. However, World Bank lending to Pakistan 
has fluctuated over time. After the year 1990, Pakistan received the lowest 
amount of total official flows from the World Bank (US $ 300.8 million), in 
the year 2000. Then, suddenly, in 2001, World Bank lending to Pakistan 
increased to US $ 669.17 million. Further, in the year 2002, Pakistan was 
second among the top ten recipients of high commitments from the IDA. 
Finally, with even higher disbursements than commitments (US $ 961.1 
million) in 2002, Pakistan became highest recipient of World Bank lending. 
 The Asian Development Bank has been the second largest source of 
multilateral financing to Pakistan, following the World Bank. Since 1968, 
Pakistan has received more than US $ 12.6 billion in loans from the ADB, 
making it the second largest borrower, after Indonesia. At the end of 2001, 
ADB funding to Pakistan increased by 148% from the previous year to US $ 
957 million. In 2002, the country further received more than US $ 1 billion 
and became the top client of the ADB concessional lending window from the 
Asian Development Bank fund (ADBf). 
 The bulk of this lending from the World Bank and the ADB, especially 
in the last two decades, occurred under various structural adjustment 
programmes and to support Social Action Programmes. Loans given towards 
structural adjustment programmes were predefined for reforms in the 
financial sector, tax system, public utilities and public expenditure, in order 
to reduce trade and budget deficits. However, Hasan (1998) observes that 
although macroeconomic imbalances remained high above the agreed goals 
and showed little signs of improvements, World Bank lending actually 
increased during 1990s. In addition, a sizable portion of this lending was in 
the form of relatively quickly disbursed policy lending in contrast to lending 
for specific projects. Although projects like the Social Action Programme 
Project I (SAPP-I), launched in 1992 to improve the delivery of social 
services in primary education, basic health care, family planning and rural 
water supply showed disheartening results, financing of the SAPP-II by IFIs 
continued in 1996. Foreign donors, under the leadership of the World Bank 
and Pakistan itself, spent US $ 8 billion on the Social Action Programme 
project, but data seems to indicate that the SAPP has failed (Easterly, 2003). 
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 The third multilateral source of finance, the IMF, entered into different 
agreements with Pakistan after 1988.1 Since that time, Pakistan has been a 
prolonged user of IMF resources. Lending from the IMF was aimed at 
providing medium term balance of payment assistance under different 
facilities, yet in practice, it served almost the same long-term development 
purposes as those resources provided by the World Bank and the ADB. 
 Although Pakistan has not experienced smooth relations with the IMF, it 
remains the top client of the IMF among developing countries. During the 
period of 1988-2000, out of a total agreed amount of IMF loans of US $ 4.07 
billion, only US $ 2.10 billion (51.5%) was actually disbursed to Pakistan. 
This was due to Pakistan’s poor track record of policy implementation. 
Nonetheless, old IMF arrangements were continuously followed by new 
arrangements, and the same unmet conditionalities were continuously 
repeated. 
 As reported by the IMF independent evaluation office (2002), Pakistan 
may be the classic example to suggest that the decision making process of 
the IMF since the 1980s has been politically driven to a large extent. 
Personal contacts also appear to play a major role. In fact, at different points 
in time, talks resumed and arrangements were concluded with the IMF and 
the World Bank when the governments of Pakistan directly included high-
level staff from these institutions. Mahbubul Haq, former Director of the 
World Bank, was the Finance Minister of Pakistan in 1988, Moeen Qureshi, 
Senior Vice-President of the World Bank was caretaker Prime Minister of 
Pakistan in 1993, and Shahid Javed Burki, Vice-President of the World 
Bank, was Finance Minister of Pakistan in 1994 and 1996. In 1988, 1993 and 
1996, this coincided with new lending arrangements. 
 It appears that more than merely development or economic considera-
tions drive the major IFIs’ lending to Pakistan and thereby, to a large extent, 
the overall multilateral lending received by this country. IFIs’ lending 
through structural adjustment programmes, sectoral lending and lending for 
economic reform in the last two decades and earlier casts some doubts on the 
relevance of officially stated lending policies, which emphasize economic 
need and policy performance (merit). Thus, IFIs’ lending to Pakistan will be 
examined in more detail in the following section, with special attention to the 
interests of the different actors within these institutions. 
                                                 
1Pakistan entered into its first agreement with the IMF in 1958, but the amount was not 
determined, and no further substantial agreement was made until 1988. 
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III.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IFIs’ LENDING 
TO PAKISTAN 
It is already widely accepted in the literature that an appropriate model to 
explain lending decisions should be comprehensive and take into account the 
potential effect of both donor interest and the recipient’s need and merit. This 
section will explain this ‘hybrid’ model, in which multilateral donors’ 
interests can be accounted for by the bureaucratic inertia and political interest 
of the multilateral organizations. As discussed in section II, the bureaucratic 
interest of IFIs could have an influence on lending decisions to Pakistan. 
Barro and Lee (2005) find some evidence for this hypothesis when analyzing 
IMF lending to a large set of countries. This approach is based on economic 
models of bureaucracy, in which bureaucrats disburse money in order to 
maximize their own utility (Easterly, 2002). Moreover, donor governments 
within IFIs have their own preferences and often attempt to use IFIs for their 
own purposes (Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Dreher and Jensen, 2003; Andersen 
et al., 2005). With this in mind, while considering IFIs’ lending to Pakistan, 
we view IFIs as bureaucratic and political institutions which maximize the 
utility of their stakeholders, i.e. of bureaucrats and major shareholder 
countries. 
DETERMINANTS OF IFIs’ LENDING DECISIONS: SOME 
THEORETICAL HYPOTHESES 
The motives of lending which directly correspond to IFIs’ openly declared 
objectives can be described in two different sets of variables. The first 
determines the needs of recipients, and the second captures their “merits”, 
i.e. their previous efforts to establish a sound economic policy environment 
(Berthélemy, 2006; Cline and Sargen, 1975). 
 With respect to economic needs, we should generally consider that, 
under the given economic conditions, Pakistan falls into the category of a 
low income country, reaching a per capita gross national income of only 
US $ 520 in the year 2003 (World Bank 2004b). This is far below the IDA 
established lending threshold of US $ 865. A large part of the country’s 
population, almost 33 percent, is facing absolute poverty, as measured on the 
basis of the national poverty line. Poverty rates fell during the 1980s and 
early 1990s, but started to rise again towards the end of the 1990s. In 
addition, over last few decades, Pakistan’s economy has faced many serious 
economic problems, on both internal and external economic fronts. In these 
situations and throughout the 1970s and the late 1990s, the country was 
clearly in need of foreign resources. According to the objectives initially 
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defined by multilateral financial institutions for distributing loans, and as 
taken up by Frey and Schneider (1986) for the World Bank and Barro and 
Lee (2005) for the IMF, IFIs’ lending should be based on the economic 
needs of a country. Thus, Pakistan should have received more lending from 
international organizations in those times when it faced particular economic 
hardship, as concluded in our first testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: IFIs’ lending to Pakistan is positively related to the country’s 
economic needs 
We now come to the aspect of “merit”, which is typically referred to in terms 
of “good governance”. Good governance is a multifaceted concept, and both 
the economic and the more general political dimension are relevant here. As 
a first step, let us consider economic governance. According to official 
development policy lending strategies, the implementation of economic and 
social policies that promote growth is another basic criterion for IFIs’ loan 
allocation. The World Bank and IMF joint strategy papers state that 
development policy lending is normally undertaken only in a country that has 
an adequate macroeconomic framework in place. Therefore, lending should 
contain positive incentives, and good performance should be rewarded with 
more lending from IFIs (Cline and Sargen, 1975; Burnside and Dollar, 
2000). Although Pakistan is a poor country, the economy showed an 
impressive economic performance during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Conversely, in the 1970s, economic performance was very poor, and it also 
slowed down again considerably in the late 1990s, due to imprudent policies, 
which resulted in a rather inconsistent pattern of growth. These variations 
should be expected to find their reflection in IFIs’ lending. This leads us to 
formulate our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: IFIs’ lending to Pakistan is positively related to an improved 
performance of the country’s economy 
While Hypothesis 2 covers economic governance, we now move on to 
political governance, which constitutes the other merit-based criterion for IFI 
lending. Strong arguments can be made that good political governance 
indirectly influences economic growth and leads to reduce poverty (Rodrik 
2003). If this is true, we should expect IFIs to take into account not only 
economic, but also political governance when making their lending 
decisions. However, previous studies on IMF and World Bank lending do 
not find much evidence for a relationship between political governance 
indicators and lending decisions (Bird and Rowlands, 2001; Barro and Lee, 
2005; Kilby, 2006). Pakistan, which has experienced different types of 
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governments, weak political institutions and many periods of low govern-
ment effectiveness, represents an interesting additional testing ground for 
whether political governance has had any effect on IFIs’ lending decisions. 
This leads us to our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: IFIs’ lending to Pakistan is positively related to good political 
governance 
So far we have only considered the development policy, or need and merit 
oriented motives of IFIs’ lending. Let us now turn to the political economic 
motives of IFIs’ lending to Pakistan. We assume that, concerning lending 
decisions to developing countries, IFIs must be understood as both 
bureaucratic and political organizations. The bureaucrats working in these 
institutions can be expected to lobby for decisions and lending in favor of 
their home economies, so that they can get better positions in their respective 
home governments later on. Any decision in favor of their country, including 
higher lending to their country, will add to their own utility (Frey and 
Schneider, 1986; Barro and Lee, 2005). Thus, bureaucrats at multilateral 
organizations have an incentive to disburse money to their home countries, 
even if their home countries have not complied with previous targets and 
conditionalities (Mosley et al., 1991; Dreher, 2004). As pointed out in 
section I, there have been several instances in which Pakistan did not comply 
with IFIs’ conditionalities, but still received new funding. Simultaneously, 
we observe significant changes in Pakistan’s representation in IFIs’ major 
decision making bodies. 
 According to the political economic literature cited above, it can be 
assumed that any position of power held by national bureaucrats in 
international organizations will be used to obtain more loans for their own 
country, and ultimately to maximize their own individual utility. This leads 
us to formulate our fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the number and the stronger the bureaucratic 
power of Pakistani nationals at IFIs, the higher the 
probability of Pakistan receiving more and larger loans 
Another political economic motive for distributing resource, also related to 
bureaucratic interest, could be what Birdsall et al. (2003) describe as 
“defensive lending”. The idea is that loans with a high probability of default 
are followed by new loans, so that the latter ensure the repayment of the 
former. Accordingly, when debt burdens grow, lending may increase. In fact, 
for the international bureaucracy, avoiding default is very important as it 
would do harm to their image as a competent decision making body. 
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Moreover, lending in general, even to countries which have already 
accumulated high debt burdens from prior lending, is consistent with the 
general bureaucratic objective of maximizing the overall flow of resources. 
This resource flow is in turn related to the overall budget of their organiza-
tion, and thus indirectly to bureaucrats’ pay and prestige (Vaubel, 1991). 
 Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan (2003) show that countries with higher 
debt, especially those indebted to international organizations, have indeed 
received larger net transfers than other countries. Based on the data on 
external debt and resource flows to Pakistan, it appears that Pakistan’s debt 
stock has grown very rapidly in the last three decades. The IDA total 
outstanding debt alone grew 5 times over the period from 1983 to 2003 
(World Bank, 2004). Anecdotal evidence suggests that in 1999, Pakistan was 
close to default when the IMF resumed its lending. The arguments with 
respect to defensive lending are summarized by our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The higher Pakistan’s debt to IFIs, the higher the probability 
for new lending and a higher volume of lending 
Another common perception in the political economics of international 
organizations is that IFIs serve the economic and political interests of their 
major shareholders (Stone, 2004; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Kilby, 2006). Thus, 
any country that has close economic and political ties with the major 
shareholders (e.g. the US and Japan) of multilateral organizations will be 
more likely to receive loans from IFIs, and the size of the loans is likely to be 
larger. The US and Japan can exert pressure on IFIs in different ways, 
particularly through their executive directors on the board, who have the 
maximum number of votes. Specifically, at the IMF, some important 
decisions require more than 85% of the votes. In this case, Japan and the US 
alone can block lending decisions. Pakistan has gone through different 
phases of political and economic relations with these countries. Particularly, 
relations with the US worsened after the imposition of sanctions under the 
Pressler Amendment at the US senate.2 We expect that IFIs’ lending to 
Pakistan depends on variations in the country’s bilateral economic and 
political relationships with major shareholder countries. We capture this in 
our final hypothesis: 
                                                 
2The Pressler Amendment passed in the US Senate in 1985 requested the US President to 
personally certify that there would be no risk of nuclear arms development in Pakistan. 
Without this certification, no more aid could be committed to this country.  
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Hypothesis 6: Closer economic links between Pakistan and the US and/or 
Japan, or higher political or strategic relevance of Pakistan 
for these countries will increase Pakistan’s chances of 
obtaining more and higher loans from IFIs 
Overall, along with considerations of the country’s need and merit, we retain 
bureaucratic interests as well as US and Japanese economic interests as 
potential determinants of IFIs’ lending to Pakistan. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF IFIs’ LENDING TO PAKISTAN OVER 
TIME 
In order to empirically test these hypotheses we adopt the Tobit econometric 
estimation method, used recently in most aid allocation studies. The 
advantage of such an approach is that we can take into account the censored 
nature of gross total official flows from IFIs to Pakistan over time. This 
method estimates the aid flows in one step and is appropriate if the 
exogenous variables can be expected to have the same impact on the 
probability of receiving aid and on the amount of aid allocated thereafter 
(Gang and Lehman, 1990; Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004). 
 The gross disbursement of total official flows to Pakistan relative to the 
total flows to developing countries (TOFDev) and to low-income countries 
(TOFLic) were taken from OECD/DAC (2005) data as the dependent 
variables, in order to analyze IFIs’ lending decisions to Pakistan. Using 
disbursements rather than commitments reflects the actual spending of aid 
funds, and using gross as opposed to net flows avoids the consideration of 
those debt repayments which are carried out under the authority of the 
recipient rather than the donor country. Given the focus of our study, 
Pakistan’s share of aid as compared to aid received by other developing 
countries emerges as a natural choice for the dependent variable, rather than 
the level of aid or aid per capita. It captures the relative importance of the 
country as compared to other recipients of multilateral aid flows. Cross-
country studies which also include middle and higher income countries, such 
as those by Trumball and Wall (1994), Fleck and Kilby (2006) and Kilby 
(2006), only use the share of aid relative to lending to all developing 
countries. However, as we are only considering Pakistan, which is a low-
income country, its share of aid receipt among low-income countries could 
be a relevant alternative indicator. Taking into account both alternatives 
could be important especially if we assume that there might be predefined 
overall amounts for specific country groups such as low-income countries. 
Note, for instance, that only the latter are eligible for IDA loans at all. Each 
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institution is considered in the panel, starting from the year in which its 
lending to developing countries was established. The IBRD, IDA, ADB and 
IMF established their lending in 1952, 1961, 1968 and 1977 respectively. 
However, data on the IBRD’s lending to Pakistan is only provided by the 
OECE from 1960 onwards. 
 To examine Pakistan’s economic need and merit in relation to IFIs’ 
lending decisions as addressed in hypotheses 1 to 3, we require information 
on economic variables related to economic need and performance. The most 
direct indicator of any country’s need for international aid flows is per capita 
GDP. Moreover, other studies on IFIs’ lending decisions, i.e. those by Bird 
and Rowlands (2001) and Frey and Schneider (1986), also suggest using 
current account and government budget deficits as indicators of internal and 
external economic strains. Therefore, to measure the economic needs of 
Pakistan’s economy, we use the data on per capita GDP (GDPPC), current 
account deficit as a percentage of GDP (CurrentAcDef), and the overall 
budget deficit as a percentage of GDP (BudgetDef), from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2004c). For detailed definitions of 
variables and their sources, see Anwar (2006). 
 To determine the performance of Pakistan’s economy, the annual GPD 
growth rate (GDPg) was taken as the indicator variable. Higher GDP growth 
indicates better economic performance. The data is again taken from the 
World Bank (2004c). The GDP growth rate as well as all other economic 
variables for determining IFIs’ lending to Pakistan were used with a one-
period lag, as fully updated information is generally not available for 
decision making, even for international institutions. 
 In order to measure good political governance, previous studies (see 
Barro and Lee, 2005) use the rule of law and democracy. However, Mosley, 
Harrigan and Toye (1991) argue that political stability, i.e. in particular the 
frequency of change in government, might be a preferable indicator for 
political governance. This may be true in particular for early years in which 
comprehensive indicators on democracy and the rule of law were not 
available. The Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) governance indicators 
were computed only in 1996, and even the Freedom House index on political 
rights and civil liberties has only existed since the early 1970s. Thus, we try 
to capture political governance here by looking at political instability 
(PolInstab), which allows us to compute the required time series starting 
from 1960. 
 Political instability measured in terms of changes in government is well 
adapted to Pakistan, because changes in the Pakistani government before 
166 Pakistan Economic and Social Review 
completion of tenure have been frequent. In our calculations, any change in 
the Pakistani government in a particular year is assigned a 1, while a 0 
represents no changes. Taking a moving average of five year periods, we 
establish an index on a scale from 0 to 1. A value closer to 1 indicates a 
higher number of government changes, i.e. higher political instability. The 
data for changes in government was taken from the Polity IV Project (2002). 
 It would have also been interesting for our analysis to have information 
on the number of Pakistani professional and managerial staff at each 
institution, in order to measure the effect of bureaucratic pressure and 
lobbying behaviour of these bureaucrats on IFIs’ lending to Pakistan. 
Unfortunately, however, there is no such data available from the IFIs, and 
where it is available, for example from the IMF Diversity Office, it is only 
for very short periods of time. Thus, alternatively, we used the Pakistani 
executive director voting power (Pk_ed_vp) as a percentage of total voting 
power of all the executive directors on the board. This data was taken from 
the annual reports of the World Bank, ADB and IMF (World Bank, ADB 
and IMF annual report, Various Years). This variable takes into account the 
Pakistani national executive director, or alternative executive director, 
representing Pakistan and the group of countries by whom he was elected to 
the executive board of IFIs. In the case of a temporary Pakistani alternative 
executive director at the IMF, we multiplied voting power by 0.5, in order to 
weigh down the position relative to full power. To further explain the 
bureaucratic interests of IFIs’ lending, the information on Pakistani nationals 
working in top positions, including vice presidents and directors, was 
gathered from the annual reports of the World Bank, ADB and IMF. The 
numbers of Pakistani top officials (Pk_off) were taken as the percentage of 
total officers of each institution. Vacant posts were not taken into account 
while compiling the data. 
 We consider Pakistan’s debt to all multilateral institutions as a 
percentage of total debt (MultiDt), in order to test our fifth hypothesis. The 
variable is used with a one-period lag, considering that the decision making 
process at IFIs takes some time. The data is taken from Global Development 
Finance (World Bank 2004d). 
 Finally, the economic interests that major shareholders of IFIs may have 
in Pakistan, as a factor of determination of the IFIs’ lending to Pakistan (as 
suggested in Hypothesis 6), is measured by the trade intensity of the US and 
Japan with Pakistan. Trade intensity of Pakistan with the US (USTrade) and 
Japan (JPTrade) is reflected by bilateral trade (exports + imports) between 
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Pakistan and these countries, expressed as a ratio of Pakistan’s GDP. The 
data was taken from the IMF (IMF-Directions of Trade Statistics 2004). 
 In order to capture the political interests related to lending of the IFIs’ 
major shareholders, we included various dummy variables, in particular a 
dummy for 1985, the year in which the Pressler Amendment was passed in 
the US Senate, and a dummy (dummy01-02) for the years 2001 and 2002, to 
capture the post September 11th effect on aid allocation to Pakistan. In some 
studies on IMF and IDA lending, US political interest is reflected by voting 
behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly. In line with this, we 
include Pakistan’s political proximity to the US, measured by voting in the 
UN General Assembly. We also take into account bilateral aid from major 
shareholder countries as additional variables. In order to test IFIs’ response 
to international crises, such as the Latin American debt crises and Asian 
crises, and their effects on IFIs lending to Pakistan, we also introduce 
dummies for the early 1980s and the late 1990s, respectively. 
 Table 1 presents the results of our regression analysis. We use both an 
overall pooled Tobit model and a Tobit model with IFI specific random 
effects. The latter was also adopted by Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and 
Barro and Lee (2005). 
 Fixed effects cannot be considered as a relevant alternative. They lead to 
inconsistent estimates because they cannot be estimated based on the total 
number of observations but only on the (rather limited) number of 
observations for different points in time within each institution. This creates 
estimation problems for Probit models, as they rely on large sample 
properties, and consequently for Tobit models as well.3 Regressions 1 and 2 
show IFIs’ lending to Pakistan relative to lending to other low-income 
countries (TOFLic). The following four regressions present the results of 
IFIs’ lending to Pakistan relative to all developing countries (TOFDev). 
Between regressions 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, model specifications differ only 
with respect to the inclusion of random effects for individual IFIs. 
Regression model 3 is then further enlarged to include trade with the US and 
Japan (regressions 5 and 6), political instability and a dummy for the 
September 11th effect (regression 6 only). In addition, regression model 6 
was also estimated with random effects, but since results remained virtually 
unchanged, this specification was not included in Table 1. All models were 
                                                 
3For a detailed discussion of this problem, generally referred to as the incidental parameters 
problem, see Greene (2004). 
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also estimated including the additional variables discussed above (US policy 
dummy for the Pressler Amendment and bilateral aid), but as they neither 
turned out to be significant nor changed the results in any relevant way, we 
decided to exclude them from the presentation. 
TABLE  1 
Regression Results for IFIs’ Lending to Pakistan 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 
Tobit Random 
Effects 
Tobit Random 
Effects 
Tobit Tobit 
TOFLic TOFLic TOFDev TOFDev TOFDev TOFDev 
 
Est. p-val. Est. p-val. Est. p-val. Est. p-val. Est. p-val. Est. p-val. 
Recipient need 
GDPPC –0.16 0.00 –0.15 0.00 –0.04 0.03 –0.03 0.03 –0.04 0.01 –0.02 0.41
CurrentAcDef 1.20 0.14 1.22 0.13 0.27 0.39 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.38 0.22 0.58
BudgetDef –1.58 0.25 –1.59 0.24 –0.24 0.65 –0.24 0.61 –0.49 0.35 –0.52 0.35
Recipient merit 
GDPg –0.65 0.49 –0.69 0.46 –0.02 0.96 –0.09 0.78 –0.29 0.45 –0.55 0.18
PolInstab 11.12 0.11
Bureaucratic interest 
Pk_ed_vp 4.57 0.00 3.80 0.11 1.88 0.00 0.63 0.05 1.91 0.00 1.92 0.00
Pk_off 0.68 0.50 0.44 0.70 –0.11 0.76 –0.61 0.08 –0.11 0.77 –0.12 0.73
MultiDt 0.74 0.09 0.75 0.08 0.16 0.33 0.16 0.29 0.21 0.19 –0.07 0.76
Bilateral donor interest 
USTrade  0.52 0.67 –0.43 0.75
JPTrade  1.59 0.03 1.47 0.07
dummy01_02  1.66 0.64
constant 49.98 0.00 51.80 0.00 11.66 0.07 18.72 0.00 7.64 0.35 10.07 0.23
N 104 104  104 104 104 104
Censored Obs. 14 14  14 14 14 14
LR/Wald Chi2 52.16 0.00 20.22 0.00 47.81 0.00 15.49 0.03 52.62 0.00 55.53 0.00
Notes: Italic indicates significance at the 10% level. Bold indicates significance 
at the 5% level. Bold underlined indicates significance at the 1% level. 
For a detailed description of the variables and their sources, see Anwar 
(2006). 
 As could be expected, per capita GDP has a significant negative effect in 
all the regressions except regression 6, where the effect is negative but not 
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significant. The estimated coefficient implies that, ceteris paribus, a low per 
capita GDP in Pakistan will raise the probability and volume of IFIs’ lending 
to Pakistan. In contrast, the other variables representing Pakistan’s economic 
need, i.e. current account and budgetary deficits, are not significant in any of 
the regressions presented in Table 1. All in all, these results provide only 
partial evidence for Hypothesis 1. 
 It should be noted, however, that the interpretation of the effect of the 
current account and budget deficit may be ambiguous. On the one hand, high 
deficits indicate a strong need for external resources, but on the other hand, 
they can be the result of bad economic policy. If IFIs react partially in 
response to need, and partially in response to merit, the overall sign of the 
coefficients is undetermined, and the coefficient estimate will only be 
significant if one consideration clearly dominates. To a certain extent, this 
ambiguity also arises with respect to the interpretation of the coefficient of 
GDP growth. However, as we have included GDP per capita separately, the 
objectives of reacting to need on the one hand, and rewarding good economic 
performance on the other hand, are more easily separable here. 
 The estimated coefficient of the annual GDP growth rate shows a 
negative sign, but does not appear to be significant in any of the regressions. 
This implies that our data do not give any support to hypothesis 2, i.e. a 
positive relationship between IFIs’ lending to Pakistan and the performance 
of Pakistan’s economy. If we were to interpret this insignificant coefficient at 
all, the negative sign shows that higher growth may reduce rather than 
increase lending from the IFIs. 
 Results for good governance represented by political stability in regres-
sion 6 do not confirm our initial hypothesis either. While the coefficient is 
not fully significant (p-value = 11%), it shows a positive sign, indicating that 
if a relationship exists at all, frequent change in the government, and hence 
more political instability, seems to be rewarded rather than penalized by IFIs. 
 In comparison with the need and merit variables, the IFI interest 
variables and the variables for shareholder interest appear to be more 
significant in our regression results. The bureaucratic interests measured by 
the Pakistani executive director voting power at each institution are 
significant in all but one regression and close to significant, at least at the 10 
percent level, even there. We thus find evidence for a robust link between the 
power exercised by bureaucrats and lending to their home countries. The 
other variable (Pk_off) representing the lobbying behaviour of Pakistani 
national bureaucrats at IFIs in support of more lending for Pakistan, is not 
significant in our models presented in Table 1. This could be due to the fact 
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that, as opposed to the political staff, i.e. the executive directors, the 
administrative staff does not consider their home country’s relative position, 
but simply argues for higher funding for their country, whatever the situation 
for other countries may be. Nevertheless, administrative staff clearly does 
not directly make lending decisions, but only indirectly influences decision 
making through lobbying at the executive board, whenever there is a higher 
chance of achieving decisions in favor of their country. Moreover, the 
professional staff under their responsibility generally prepares the relevant 
policy papers and meeting documents, giving them a certain agenda setting 
power as well. As pointed out by Barro and Lee (2005), it is also possible 
that certain bureaucrats provide insider information to their home countries. 
Thus, international bureaucrats can play an indirect role in IFI lending to 
their countries of origin. Unfortunately, as we do not have information on the 
number of all administrative officers, but only on top officials, the overall 
effect might be quite imprecisely estimated in our regressions. 
 We observe that Pakistan’s debt to multilateral institutions as one of the 
determinants of lending becomes significant in the first two regressions, with 
the expected positive sign. This provides some evidence of defensive 
lending, i.e. of IFIs’ attempt to ensure the repayment of their previous loans 
by awarding new loans. However, this statement should be interpreted with 
caution, since the variable (MultiDt) loses its significance in the regressions 
where lending to Pakistan is taken as a percentage of lending to all 
developing countries. With this in mind, we have only limited support for 
our fifth hypothesis. 
 The results of regressions 5 and 6 show that Japanese trade is positively 
and significantly related to IFIs’ lending to Pakistan, while this is not the 
case for US trade. This implies that IFIs’ lending to Pakistan is more closely 
linked with Japanese economic interests than with those of the US. One 
reason might be that US interests in Pakistan – as far as channeled through 
international organizations – is of a more geopolitical and strategic, rather 
than economic nature. Anecdotal evidence suggests the relevance of US 
political interests for IMF and World Bank decisions. The data shows that 
lending to Pakistan by IFIs jumped after Pakistan joined the US-led coalition 
against terrorism following September 11th, 2001 (Calomiris, 2000; 
Economist, 2001). Trying to capture this by a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 from 2001 onwards, does not, however, lead to any significant 
results. As we will see later, this can be explained by the strongly varying 
reactions of different IFIs in this respect. As already mentioned above, other 
indicators of bilateral shareholders’ political interest, i.e. the dummy for the 
Pressler Amendment, political proximity with the US measured by voting in 
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UN General Assembly and the volume of bilateral aid, were not found to be 
significant in any regression specification (for additional specifications, 
contact author). It should be noted, however, that political interest is 
extremely difficult to capture, so that insignificance of these results may be 
related, at least to some extent, to the weak indicators at hand. Additional 
dummy variables in response to international crises, such as the Latin 
American debt crises of the 1980s and the Asian financial crises in to the 
1990s, do not turn out to be significant either. Apparently, Pakistan’s relative 
position as a recipient of IFIs’ aid, thus, remained largely unaffected by these 
economic shocks. 
 Overall, the results are plausible, and support the idea that bureaucratic 
interests are at least as important as considerations of recipients’ needs or 
merit in determining IFIs’ lending to Pakistan. With the data at hand, 
hypothesis 1, regarding country need considerations, finds some support, but 
it loses its relevance in the full model (specification 6). There is no 
significant evidence for hypothesis 2, on a positive relationship between 
lending and good economic performance. Hypothesis 3, regarding country 
merit and measured in terms of political stability, can be rejected. At the 
same time, hypotheses 4 and 5, on the role of bureaucracy, find clear support, 
and hypothesis 6, on the economic interests of major shareholders of IFIs, 
finds some positive support for Japan, although the result is less strongly 
significant than in the case of bureaucratic interests. Thus, IFIs’ bureaucratic 
interest and bilateral donor interest appear to be the most relevant 
determinants of IFIs’ decision making on lending to Pakistan. 
COMPARISON AMONG IFIs 
In the previous section we assumed that all IFIs behave in the same way 
when lending to Pakistan. However, Willett (2001) points out that while 
there has been an increasing overlap of the activities of the World Bank and 
IMF over time, there is still a significant difference between the major 
outputs of these institutions, not to mention the fact that the autonomy of 
bureaucracies also varies between the organizations. In the case of Pakistan, 
anecdotal evidence shows differences in institutional lending behaviour over 
time. For example, the ADB continued its lending to Pakistan throughout the 
1990s, even as the World Bank and the IMF disengaged their lending 
operations due to the US-led sanctions that had been imposed on the country, 
making it difficult for these institutions to gain clearance from their boards. 
In this section, we will empirically test and compare different IFIs and point 
out the political economic factors behind their different or similar behaviour. 
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 In order to analyze the behaviour of different IFIs and to test whether 
coefficients for a given IFI differ from those of another IFI, we have 
constructed new explanatory variables from the variables used in Table 1, 
regression 6. By multiplying each explanatory variable with the dummy 
variable for each institution, we end up with 44 variables specific to each of 
the four institutions in combination with each of the eleven explanatory 
variables. These variables are then taken up one by one, with the rest of the 
explanatory variables from regression 6 left unchanged, i.e. assuming 
constant coefficients as before. All in all, 44 different Tobit estimations were 
carried out to test the significance of the additional term in each case. The 
estimated coefficient along with the signs of these institution-specific 
variables show clear differences among IFIs concerning their lending to 
Pakistan. The signs of the coefficients indicate in which direction the 
influence of any particular variable on the lending decisions of a specific IFI 
differs from the influence of the same variable for all IFIs jointly. Table 2 
clarifies the exposition by presenting an overview of direction and level of 
significance of the institution-specific variables. 
 The overall results clearly show two distinct groups of IFIs, in terms of 
their lending to Pakistan. It appears that the IDA and ADB, the two more 
concessional lenders, have almost the same lending preferences, whereas the 
IBRD and IMF constitute a different group, again with strong similarities. 
 As opposed to what might have been expected, the IMF and the IBRD, 
which are most frequently under public criticism for their lending practices, 
can be shown to be by no means less oriented towards recipient need and 
merit than the IDA and the ADB. As for recipient need, as measured by per 
capita income, the IMF and the IBRD even seem to be clearly more 
responsive, as they show a more strongly negative relationship between the 
recipient’s per capita income and lending. These differences are clearly 
significant throughout. 
 At the same time, looking at current account and budget deficits, the 
IDA and ADB seem to react more strongly on need, i.e. they tend to lend 
relatively more at times of strong deficits (in particular budget deficits, for 
current account deficits, there is not much evidence of significant 
differences). As mentioned before, however, it is difficult to interpret the 
reaction on deficits merely in terms of recipient need. Alternatively, low 
deficits may be interpreted as an indication of good policy performance, in 
which case IMF and IBRD lending decisions could be interpreted as merit 
based. 
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TABLE  2 
Tobit Estimated Parameters by IFIs 
 IMF IBRD IDA ADB 
Recipient need 
GDPPC --- -- ++ +++ 
CurrentAcDef n.s. - n.s. n.s. 
BudgetDef -- -- ++ +++ 
Recipient merit 
GDPg --- n.s. +++ +++ 
PolInstab n.s. -- + +++ 
Bureaucratic interest 
Pk_ed_vp --- -- + +++ 
Pk_off --- -- ++ +++ 
MultiDt - -- ++ +++ 
Bilateral donor interest 
USTrade -- -- +++ +++ 
JPTrade --- - ++ +++ 
dummy01_02 n.s. -- ++ n.s. 
Notes: +++ (---) = significant positive (negative) at 1% level; ++ (--) = significant 
positive (negative) at 5% level; + (-) = significant positive (negative) at 
10% level; n.s. = non significant. For detailed description of the variables 
and their sources, see Anwar (2006). 
 The signs indicate the difference between the effect for each individual 
IFIs and the effect for all IFIs jointly. 
 Similarly, the IDA and ADB seem to reward growth more than do the 
IBRD and the IMF. So far, this has been interpreted as a reaction to 
promising economic performance, i.e. good (economic) governance. At the 
same time, good governance in terms of political stability seems to be 
considered more seriously by the IBRD, while the IDA and ADB tend to 
reward political instability. This inconsistency in the reaction to the two 
different governance indicators may raise doubts about the interpretation of 
the economic growth variable. In fact, while being an indicator of successful 
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economic policy, high growth rates also imply that a country becomes 
increasingly interesting as a partner for trade and investment. Therefore, 
supporting countries with high growth rates may be in the interests of those 
major bilateral donors represented on the boards of the different international 
institutions. We will return to this point below. 
 Turning to the political economic grounds for lending, the lending 
record of the IDA and ADB, compared to that of the IBRD and IMF, 
provides more evidence of such motivations. We observe that both IDA and 
ADB lending to Pakistan is much more strongly related to Pakistani national 
bureaucratic power and to the number of Pakistani officers at these 
institutions, than is IBRD and IMF lending. Our results, showing that the 
IDA and ADB are more heavily influenced by their respective bureaucracies 
than the IMF and the IBRD, and that they have been lending money on 
political economic grounds rather than for development economic reasons, 
finds further support when we examine the evidence for defensive lending. 
 There is clearly more evidence for defensive lending from the IDA and 
the ADB than from the IMF and the IBRD. The former two organizations 
thus appear to use more important shares of their new credits to ensure the 
repayment of previous ones. In other words, bureaucrats issue new credits to 
avoid losing face by acknowledging their creditor’s default. 
 Finally, even the influence of the economic interests of their major 
shareholder countries, the US and Japan, appears to be much stronger at the 
IDA and the ADB than at the IMF and the IBRD. Thus, the development of 
Pakistani trade relations with these two major stakeholder countries has been 
more relevant for loans from the IDA and ADB. Concerning the political 
interests of major shareholders, e.g. joining the US-led coalition on war 
against terror, we observe no such reaction from the IBRD, IMF and ADB. 
Following this event, the IDA, however, considerably increased its lending 
to Pakistan. In Table 2, this difference in response to the political objectives 
of the US as a major shareholder is reflected in the positively significant 
coefficient for the IDA interaction term with the post September 11th 
dummy. This reinforces the evidence for interest oriented, rather than 
economic policy oriented lending from the IDA. 
 All in all, the comparison of IFIs’ lending decisions to Pakistan portrays 
two distinct groups, whereby the two less concessional lenders, the IMF and 
IBRD, seem to be driven more strongly by recipient need and merit 
considerations than the two other lenders, the IDA and ADB. Conversely, 
decisions at the IDA and the ADB seem to be driven more strongly by 
bureaucratic and stakeholder economic interests. 
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 While this result may be rather unexpected, it could be argued that 
highly concessional lending is more attractive for recipient countries and 
therefore induces more active lobbying by national bureaucrats in the 
respective financing institutions. Moreover, as funds include a significant 
grant component, major shareholders might consider that they should be 
allowed to at least use these funds in a way that benefits their own 
economies. Finally, it could be that the IMF and the IBRD are generally 
under closer international scrutiny by NGOs and academic researchers. As a 
regional bank, the ADB does not attract as much attention as an international 
organization with worldwide membership. And the IDA might escape closer 
scrutiny due to its focus on low-income countries, which could provide some 
kind of “immunizing” anti-poverty stamp. Closer international scrutiny 
obviously induces utility maximizing bureaucrats and shareholder countries 
to be more careful, as there is a higher risk of losing international renown. 
 However, while these may be plausible arguments, it must of course be 
kept in mind that our results are based merely on lending to Pakistan. Similar 
studies with respect to other borrower countries are necessary to assess the 
robustness of the empirical evidence presented for this particular country-
case. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analyzed the determinants of IFIs’ lending decisions to 
Pakistan based on the example of the World Bank, the IMF and the ADB. 
While the objectives of responding to recipients’ need and rewarding good 
economic policy appear to play a role in lending decisions, Tobit regression 
results reveal that the self interest of IFIs’ bureaucracies may be more 
relevant. International bureaucrats exert their power at the executive board of 
each IFI and favor lending to their respective home economies as well as 
defensive lending to any country with a serious risk of default. Another set of 
political economic variables explaining the economic and political interests 
of the major shareholders of IFIs also turn out to be partially significant. In 
particular, some evidence can be found for the relevance of Japanese 
economic interests. US economic interests, however, cannot be shown to 
play a significant role. Moreover, the available data do not allow us to find 
any significant influence of bilateral political interests. 
 At the same time, a comparison among IFIs shows some interesting 
outcomes. The IBRD and IMF, which find themselves under strict public 
scrutiny and continuous research interest of economists and political 
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scientists, seem to be more careful to avoid a contradiction between official 
lending objectives and lending decisions. The available evidence suggests 
that these institutions react more strongly to changes in recipients’ need than 
do two other institutions, the IDA and ADB. In turn, IDA and ADB lending 
decisions are more responsive to political economic influences than those of 
the IBRD and IMF, and it seems that both bureaucratic interests and bilateral 
donor interests play the most important role there. 
 All in all, using Tobit estimation and various specifications, based on the 
example of the World Bank, IMF and ADB lending to Pakistan, this paper 
provides evidence for political economic determinants of multilateral 
lending. It seems that IFIs, in particular the ADB and the IDA, move away 
from their originally defined economic lending objectives. Thus, it remains a 
promising agenda for future research to explore how international donor 
institutions behave regarding lending decisions to other countries. 
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